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HAWK: Rapid Android Malware Detection through
Heterogeneous Graph Attention Networks
Yiming Hei, Renyu Yang, Member, IEEE, Hao Peng, Lihong Wang, Xiaolin Xu, Jianwei Liu, Hong Liu,
Jie Xu, Member, IEEE, Lichao Sun
Abstract—Android is undergoing unprecedented malicious
threats daily, but the existing methods for malware detection
often fail to cope with evolving camouflage in malware. To
address this issue, we present HAWK, a new malware detection
framework for evolutionary Android applications. We model
Android entities and behavioural relationships as a heterogeneous
information network (HIN), exploiting its rich semantic meta-
structures for specifying implicit higher-order relationships. An
incremental learning model is created to handle the applications
that manifest dynamically, without the need for re-constructing
the whole HIN and the subsequent embedding model. The model
can pinpoint rapidly the proximity between a new application
and existing in-sample applications and aggregate their numerical
embeddings under various semantics. Our experiments examine
more than 80,860 malicious and 100,375 benign applications de-
veloped over a period of seven years, showing that HAWK achieves
the highest detection accuracy against baselines and takes only
3.5ms on average to detect an out-of-sample application, with the
accelerated training time of 50x faster than the existing approach.
Index Terms—Android, malware detection, graph representa-
tion learning, HIN
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the highest market share worldwide on mobile de-vices, Android is experiencing unprecedented depend-
ability issues. Due to Android’s extensibility and openness
of development, users are put at high risk of a variety of
threats and illegal operations from malicious software, i.e.,
malware including privacy violations, data leakage, adver-
tisement spams, etc. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
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(CVE) reveals 414 Android vulnerabilities that can be easily
attacked in realistic environments. This phenomenon calls for
more reliable and accessible detection techniques.
Conventionally, Android Applications (Apps) are ana-
lyzed by either static analysis, through pre-determined sig-
natures/semantic artifacts, or dynamic analysis through multi-
level instrumentation [1]. However, static analysis could be-
come invalid by simple obfuscation, while dynamic analysis
heavily depends on OS versions and the Android runtime,
which is inherently cost-expensive and time-consuming. To
tackle this, numerous machine-learning based detection tech-
niques [2]–[8] typically leverage feature engineering to extract
key malware features and apply classification algorithms –
each app is represented as a vector – to distinguish benign soft-
ware from malicious software. Nevertheless, these approaches
often fail to capture emerging malware that either conducts
evolving camouflage and attack type or hides certain features
deliberately1. Hence, it is imperative to build an inductive and
rapid mechanism for constantly capturing software evolution
and detecting malware without heavily relying on domain-
specific feature selection.
Graph neural network (GNN), which is used to model the
relationship between entities, is developing rapidly in both
theoretical [9]–[12] and applied fields [13], [14]. Heteroge-
neous information network (HIN) [15], [16], as a special
case of graph neural network, has been widely adopted in
many areas such as operating systems, Internet of Things and
cyber-security by exploiting the abundant node and relational
semantic information before embedding into representation
vectors [17]–[20]. More specifically, in the context of malware
detection, if App1 and App2 share permission SEND_SMS
while App2 and App3 share permission READ_SMS, HIN
is able to capture the implicit semantic relationship between
App1 and App3 that can be hardly achieved by feature engi-
neering based approaches. HIN-based modelling is even more
meaningful because malware developers are extremely difficult
to hide such implicit relationships [18]. While promising, HIN
is inherently concerned about static networks/graphs [21]. The
complication is, however, how to efficiently embed the out-
of-sample nodes (i.e., incoming nodes out of the established
HIN). Considering the continuous software updates and the
huge volume of Apps, it is impossible to involve all Apps in
the stage of HIN construction and inefficient to re-construct
the entire embedding model when new Apps are seen emerg-
ing. This drawback impedes the practicality and the scale
1https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs
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this native technique can perform. Although AiDroid [21]
attempts to tackle this problem and represents each out-of-
sample App with convolutional neural network (CNN) [22], it
requires heavily multiple convolution operations resulting in
non-negligible time inefficiency.
In this paper, we present HAWK, a novel Android malware
detection framework with the aid of network representation
learning model and HIN to explore abundant but hidden
semantic information among different Apps. In particular,
we extract seven types of Android entities – including App,
permission, permission type, API, class, interface and .so file
– from the decompiled Android application package (APK)
files and establish a HIN mainly through transforming entities
and their relationships into nodes and edges, respectively. We
exploit rich semantic meta structures as the templates to define
relation sequence between two entity types. This includes both
meta path [23] and meta graph [24] that can specify the
implicit relationships among heterogeneous entities. A certain
meta structure corresponds to an adjacency matrix associated
with a homogeneous graph. The graph only contains App
nodes and is the target in the procedure of malware detection.
At the core of HAWK is the numerical embedding of all
App entities that can be then fed into a binary classifier. In
particular, HAWK involves two distinct learning models for in-
sample and out-of-sample nodes, respectively. To embed an
in-sample App, we propose MSGAT, a meta structure guided
graph attention network mechanism [25] that incorporates its
neighbors’ embedding within any meta structure and integrates
the embedding results of different meta structures into the
final node embedding. This design takes into account not
only the informative connectivity of neighbor nodes but also
the diverse semantic implications over different entity rela-
tionships. In addition, to efficiently embed an out-of-sample
App, we present MSGAT++, a new incremental learning
model upon MSGAT to make good use of the embedding of
certain existing nodes. Given a specific meta structure and its
corresponding graph, our model firstly pinpoints a specific set
of in-sample App nodes that are most similar to the target new
node, before aggregating their embedding vectors to form the
node embedding under this meta structure. Likewise, we entitle
particular weights to individual embedding vector of each meta
structure and aggregate them to obtain the final embedding.
This incremental design can quickly calculate the embedding
based on the established HIN structures without re-learning
the holistic embedding for all nodes, thereby significantly
improving the training efficiency and model scalability.
We demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of HAWK
based on 80,860 malicious and 100,375 benign Apps collected
and decompiled across VirusShare, CICAndMal and Google
AppStore. Experiments show that HAWK outperforms all
baselines in terms of accuracy and F1 score, indicating its
effectiveness and suitability for malware detection at scale. It
takes merely 3.5 milliseconds on average to detect an out-of-
sample App with accelerated training time of 50× against the
native approach that rebuilds the HIN and reruns the MSGAT.
To enable replication and foster research, we make HAWK
publicly available at: github.com/RingBDStack/HAWK.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• It examines 200,000+ Android Apps and decompiled
180,000+ APKs, spanning over seven years across multiple
open repositories. This discloses abundant data source to
establish the HIN and uncovers the hidden high-order semantic
relationships among Apps (§ III).
• It presents a meta-structure guided attention mechanism
based on HIN for node embedding, by fully exploiting neigh-
bor nodes within and across meta structures (§ IV-A). Exper-
iments show the capture of semantics can support excellent
forward and backward compatible detection capabilities.
• It proposes an incremental aggregation mechanism for
rapidly learning the embedding of out-of-sample Apps, with-
out compromising the quality of numerical embedding and
detection effectiveness. (§ IV-B).
Organization. § II depicts the motivation and outlines the
system overview. § III discusses the procedure of feature
engineering and data reshaping by leveraging HIN while § IV
details the core techniques to tackle in-sample and out-of-
sample malware detection. Experimental set-up and results are
presented in § V and § VI. Related work is discussed in § VIII
before we conclude the paper and discuss the future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
A. Motivation and Problem Scope
The Android platform is increasingly exposed to various
malicious threats and attacks. As malware detection for An-
droid systems is a response-sensitive task, our work addresses
two primary research challenges – inductive capability and
detection rapidness. Anomaly identification should allow for
forecasting new applications that we have not seen (the so-
called out-of-sample Apps) and rapidly catch up the up-to-date
malicious attacks and threats, particularly considering the vast
diversity and rapid growth of emerging malicious software.
The detection procedure is typically regarded as a binary
classification. Formally, we aim to take as input features X
of Android Apps and their previous labels (malicious/benign)
T to predict the type t of any target App either old or new.
Unfortunately, the existing approaches for malware detection
are inadequate in tackling inductive problems where new
application is arbitrary and unseen beforehand. Most of prior
work on network embedding [23], [24], [26], [27] are trans-
ductive, i.e., if a new data point is added to the testing dataset,
one has to thoroughly re-train the learning model. Hence,
malware detection is in great need of a generic inductive
learning model where any new data would be predicted, based
on an observed set of training set, without the need to re-run
the whole learning algorithm from scratch.
B. Our Approach of HAWK
Key idea. We consider this problem as a semi-supervised
learning based on graph embedding. The first innovation of
our approach, as a departure from prior work, is to encode
the information as a structured heterogeneous information
network (HIN) [15][16] wherein nodes depict entities and
their characteristics. A HIN is a graph G = (V, E ,A,R)
with an entity type mapping φ : V → A and a relationship
type mapping ψ : E → R, where V and E represent node


















Figure 1. HAWK architecture overview
and edge set, respectively. A and R denote the type set
of nodes and edge, where |A| + |R|> 2. Edges represent
the relationships between a pair of entities (e.g., an App
owns a specific permission, or a permission belongs to a
permission type). Since the detection problem is App entity
oriented, it is effective to deduce the information from a self-
contained HIN to homogeneous relational subgraphs that can
be directly absorbed by GNN. As the fundamental requirement
of graph embedding is to obtain the graph structure, we need to
calculate the adjacency matrix from the constructed HIN– the
best option to reflect the proximity and the node connectivity
in the graph. GNN models can be subsequently carried out to
learn the numerical embedding for in-sample App nodes. To
underpin the continuous embedding learning for out-of-sample
nodes, the learning model is desired to make the best use of
the embedding result of the existing in-sample App nodes, in
an incremental manner.
Architecture Overview. Fig. 1 depicts HAWK’s architecture,
encompassing Data Modeller and Malware Detector compo-
nents. Specifically, Relationship Extractor in Data Modeller
firstly offers an extraction of Android entities based on feature
engineering - massive Android Apps are compiled and investi-
gated. There are seven types of nodes (”App” together with six
characteristics) and six types of edges. HIN Constructor then
builds up the HIN by organizing entities and the extracted
relationships into nodes and edges of HIN (§ III-B). App
Graph Constructor is responsible for generating homogeneous
relational subgraphs from HIN that only contains App entities.
This is enabled by employing meta structures including both
meta path [23] and meta graph [24] (§ III-C).
Malware Detector then involves two distinct representation
learning models to numerically embed in-sample and out-
of-sample nodes, respectively. It is in great need of fully
exploiting node affinities within a given meta-structure and
aggregate the embeddings of the same node under different
meta-structures. Specifically, we design separate strategies to
learn the embedding:
• To represent in-sample App nodes, the proposed MSGAT,
a meta-structure enabled GAT solution, firstly aggregate intra-
meta-structure attention aggregation mechanism for accumu-
lating the embedding of a target node among its neighbor
nodes within the graph pertaining to a certain meta-structure.
In the second inter-meta-structure phase, we further fuse
the obtained embedding among different meta-structures so
that their semantic meanings can be represented in the final
embedding (§ IV-A).
• To efficiently tackle the out-of-sample node embedding,
we generate the embedding, incrementally, for a new node
through reusing and aggregating the embedding result of
selective in-sample App nodes in close proximity to the target
node. This requires the model to ascertain the similarity
between existing in-sample App nodes and the target node.
Similarly, the embedding is firstly gathered at neighbor node
level under a given meta-structure before conducting the inter-
meta-structure aggregation (§ IV-B).
Malware Classifier digests the learned vector embeddings
to learn a classification model to determine if a given App
is malicious or benign and then validates its effectiveness.
General purpose techniques such as Random Forest, Logistic
Regression, SVM, etc. can be adopted as the classifier imple-
mentation. We select the training set from in-sample Apps to
train our classifier, whilst using the testing set from in-sample
Apps and all out-of-sampling Apps to test the models.
III. HIN BASED DATA MODELLING
A. Feature Engineering
An Android application needs to be packaged in APK
(Android application package) format and installed on Android
system. An APK file contains code files, the configuration
AndroidManifest.xml file, the signature and verification infor-
mation, the lib (the directory containing platform-dependent
compiled codes) and other resource files. To better analyze
Android Apps, reverse tools (e.g., APKTool 2) are widely
leveraged to decompile the APK files so that the .dex source
file can be decompiled into a .smali file. To describe key
characteristics of an App, we extracted the following six types
of entities:
• Permission (P): The permission determines specific oper-
ations that an App can perform. For example, only Apps with
READ_SMS permission can access user’s email information.
• Permission Type (PT): The permission type 3 describes
the category of a given permission. Table I outlines the
permission types and representative permissions.
• Class (C): Class is an abstract module in Android codes,
where APIs and variables can be directly accesses. HAWK uses
the class name in .smali codes to represent a class.
• API: Application Programming Interface (API) provisions
the callable function in Android development environment.
• Interface (I): The interface refers to an abstract data
structure in Java. We extract the name from .samli files.
• .so file (S): .so file is Android’s dynamic link library,
which can be extracted from the decompiled lib folder.
Following this methodology, we downloaded over 200,
000 APKs from open repositories and after de-duplication
and decompilation, 181,235 APKs are finally filtered and
extracted. 63,902 entities are then selected according to [3].
This provisions abundant data sources for establishing the HIN
and mining intrinsic semantics.
2https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool
3https://developer.android.google.cn/guide/topics/permissions











































(a) Meta Schema (b) Meta Structure
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Figure 3. An example of Android HIN that contains two Android Apps.
Table I
CATEGORIES OF REPRESENTATIVE PERMISSIONS
Type Representative Permissions
NORMAl ACCESS NETWORK STATE, ACCESS WIFI STATE
CONTACTS WRITE CONTACTS, GET ACCOUNTS
PHONE READ CALL LOG, READ PHONE STATE,
CALENDAR READ CALENDAR, WRITE CALENDAR
LOCATION ACCESS FINE LOCATION,
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
STORAGE READ EXTERNAL STORAGE,
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE
SMS READ SMS, RECEIVE MMS, RECEIVE SMS
B. Constructing HIN
Extracting entity relationships into a HIN. Meta-schema
is a meta-level template that defines the relationship and
type constraints of nodes and edges in the HIN. As shown
in Fig. 2(a), we figure out a meta-schema that can encode
necessary relationships between Android entities. Based on
the domain knowledge, we elaborately examine the following
inherent semantic relationships:
• [R1] App-API indicates an App has a specific API. Using
the relationship between App and API is effective to dig out
and represent the link between two Apps [18].
• [R2] App-Permission specifies an App owns a spe-
cific permission. Apps with permissions such as READ_-
SMS, SEND_SMS, WRITE_SMS are strongly correlative [3]. If
SEND_SMS is shared between App1 and App2 and READ_-
SMS is shared between App2 and App3, an implicit association
between App1 and App3 is highly likely to manifest.
• [R3] Permission-PermissionType describes the permis-
Table II
DESCRIPTIONS OF RELATION MATRICES.
Relation Matrix Description
R1 A if App i contains the API j, ai,j is 1; otherwise 0.
R2 P if App i has the permission j, Pi,j is 1; otherwise 0.
R3 T if the type of permission i is j, Ti,j is 1; otherwise 0.
R4 C if App i owns the Class j, Ci,j is 1; otherwise 0.
R5 I if App i uses the interface j, Ii,j is 1; otherwise 0
R6 S if App i calls the so file j, Si,j is 1; otherwise 0.
sion belongs to a specific permission type. Normally, permis-
sions can be categorized into different types 4.
• [R4] App-Class means the App includes a specific class
in the external SDK. A malware tends to generate instances
by using classes in a vicious SDK 5.
• [R5] App-Interface indicates the App includes the spe-
cific interface in the external SDK.
• [R6] App-.so denotes the App has a specific .so file.
[17] demonstrates the effectiveness of associating dynamic
link libraries with software in Windows system.
Fig. 3 depicts a HIN that contains two Apps and
their semantic relationships. For instance, App1 has API
Ljava/net/URL/openConnection. Both App1 and
App2 own the Class Ljava/io/PrintStream”. The per-
mission READ_SMS belongs to the permission type SMS”, etc.
Storing entity relationships. We use a relation matrix to store
each relationship individually. For instance, we generate an
matrix A where the element Ai,j denotes if Appi contains
APIj . Intuitively, the transpose of a matrix depicts the back-
ward relationship, e.g., APIj belongs to Appi. As summarized
in Table II, six matrices are used to represent and store
the relationships [R1] to [R6]. Nevertheless, it is necessary
to obtain the connectivity between two Apps if there are
sophisticated semantic links, i.e., higher-order relationships.
C. Constructing App Graph from HIN
To form a homogeneous graph that only contains App
nodes, the key step is to incorporate the relationship between
App entity and other entities into the combined connectivity
between Apps. To ascertain the hidden higher-order semantic,
we mainly calculate Apps’ proximity via exploiting a meta-
path or meta-graph within a given HIN and then obtain the
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a meta structure, the HIN can be converted to an exclusive
homogeneous graph in which each node has meta-structure
specific neighbor nodes.
In fact, a meta-path connects a pair of nodes with a
semantically meaningful relationship. We enrich the meta-
structures further to involve the meta-graph – in the form of
directed acyclic graph (DAG) – that can be used as an extended
template to capture arbitrary but meaningful combination of
existing relationships between a pair of nodes. In effect, a
meta structure provides a filter view to extract a homogeneous
node graph, wherein all nodes satisfy particular complicated
semantics. Arguably, depending upon different meta structures,
nodes will be organized distinctly within different graphs. To
some extent, each graph can be regarded as a sub-graph of the
holistic HIN under a certain view – each sub-graph satisfies
the semantic constraints given by the meta-structure.
Meta structures. We leverage domain knowledge from system
security expertise to elaborately pick up meta structures for
covering the inherent relationships. We first combine all pos-
sible meaningful semantic meta-structures, and then carefully
select those meta-structures with sufficient precision through
numerous experiments. The detailed procedure is discussed
in §VI-C. As shown in Fig. 2(b), we eventually present six
meta paths and three meta graphs that can effectively outline
the structural semantics and capture rich relationships between
two Android Apps in the HIN. For example, A-P-A describes
the relationship where two Apps have the same permis-
sion (MP5) and A-P-PT-P-A indicates two Apps co-own
the same type of permission (MP6). MG2 simultaneously
combines A-API-A with A-S-A. Accordingly, the semantic
constraints will be tightened, i.e., the selected nodes have to
satisfy all pre-defined constraints. Nevertheless, models [28],
[29] without the manual design of original meta structures
could also be applied into our scheme.
Homogeneous App graph for each meta structure. Per-
forming a sequence of matrix operations over the modeled
relationship matrices, we can precisely calculate the adja-
cency of nodes within a graph. For a given meta-path MP ,
(A1, . . . , An), the adjacency matrix can be calculated by
ΨMP = RA1A2 ·RA2A3 · · · ·RAn−1An , (1)
where RAjAj+1 is the relation matrix between entity Aj and
Aj+1 (one instance of [R1] to [R6] in Table II). For example,
the adjacency matrix for the graph under MP1 A-API-A
is ΨMP1 = A · AT . Ψi,j>0 indicates Appi and Appj are
associated with each other, i.e., they are neighbors based on
the meta-path MP1. Specifically, the value represents the
count of meta-path instances, i.e., the number of pathways,
between node i and j. Likewise, for a given meta-graph MG,
a combination of several meta-paths, i.e., (MP1, . . . ,MPm),
the node adjacency matrix is:
ΨMG = ΨMP1 ⊙ · · · ⊙ΨMPm , (2)
where ⊙ is the operation of Hadamard Product. For instance,
MG2, the adjacency matrix can be calculated by Ψ
MG2 =
(A ·AT )⊙ (S · ST ). By conducting graph modelling for each
meta structure, the original HIN is converted to multiple App




Mk , MP , MG kth meta-structure, a meta-path or meta-graph
RAiAj Relation matrix between two entities in the HIN
SimMk (vi, vj) The similarity value between node vi and node vj under
meta-structure Mk
XMk Similarity matrix under meta-structure Mk
ΨMk Adjacency matrix under Mk that can depicts node connec-
tivity in a homo graph
Ψ̂Mk incremental segment of the adjacency matrix, connecting in-
sample nodes to new nodes
ΦMk Embedding matrix under Mk; each single row Φ
Mk
i rep-
resents the vector embedding for ith node
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Figure 4. MSGAT and MSGAT++ models for node embedding.
matrix. Given K meta-structures, we have a collection of K
adjacency matrices, i.e., {ΨM1 , ... , ΨMK}.
IV. NODE EMBEDDING MODELS
A. MSGAT: In-Sample Node Embedding
We introduce a series of innovative Graph Attention Net-
work (GAT) optimizations enhanced by meta-structures – we
employ the attention mechanism [25] among neighbor nodes
within a given meta-structure (intra-ms) and coordinate the
attention among different meta structures (inter-ms). Fig. 4
depicts the flowchart of our models and important notations
used in the models are outlined in Table III.
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Intra-ms aggregation. Intra-ms aggregation learns how a
node pay different attention to its neighbor nodes in a graph
pertaining to a meta-structure. Formally, it aggregates the
neighbors’ representation vectors with weights considering
the feature information of entities and the edge information
between entities. To do so, we initially encode the vector of
each in-sample App in the form of one-hot and concatenate
them into a matrix H . Hi·, the ith row of H , represents the
embedding vector of ith App node. Thereafter, we design an
edge weight aware GAT model (EGAT) to combine H and
the adjacency matrix pertaining to a given meta-structure Mk.
To implement the EGAT model, feature information and edge
weight information are fully utilized to aggregate features from
neighbors. More specifically, we firstly construct the adjacency
matrix ΨM
′
k with a normalization operation:
ΨM
′
k = Normalize(H ·HT ⊙ΨMk), (3)
and elements in ΨM
′
k that are lower than a pre-defined
threshold τ (τ is set to be 0.1 in our model) will be set zero.
Thereafter, we update the ΦMk with GAT model [10]:
ΦMk = GAT (H; ΨM
′
k). (4)
Eventually, the low dimensional vector embedding for all in-
sample App nodes, in a form of matrix ΦMk with a collection
of row vectors, can be obtained in this stage.
We then repeatedly calculate the vector matrix for all pre-
defined meta-structures, and obtain a collection of embedding
vectors, i.e., [ΦM1 , . . . ,ΦMK ], where K is the totality of
meta-structures. Concretely, the embedding matrix ΦMk is of
shape L×D, where L denotes the number of in-sample Apps
in the HIN and D denotes the dimension of each App vector.
As a result, the embedding of Appi node can be identified as
the ith row, i.e., ΦMki· .
Inter-ms aggregation. Since each meta structure provisions
an individual semantic view, we propose an inter-ms attention
aggregation to integrate embedding [ΦM1 , . . . ,ΦMK ] under
different semantics and thus enhance the quality of node
embedding. Specifically, we exploit a multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) procedure for learning the weight βMk of each meta-
structure Mk in the fusion:
(βM1 , . . . , βMK ) = softmax(NN(ΦM1), . . . ,NN(ΦMK )),
(5)
where NN is a native Neural Network that maps a given matrix
to a numerical value. Consequently, the final embedding for
all in-sample App nodes can be obtained through adding up




βMk · ΦMk . (6)
we then pass Φ on to another Neural Network so that the loss
function between the Neural Network’s outputs and ground-
true labels can be calibrated via iterative back-propagation.
B. MSGAT++: Incremental Embedding
To best embed unknown Apps not included in the training
procedure, we present MSGAT++, an increment learning
mechanism for utilizing the in-sample embedding already
learned from MSGAT to rapidly represent those out-of-sample
Apps. To make clear, we use vout to generally stand for any
out-of-sample node out of the HIN.
Exploring node similarity. Pinpointing the underlying con-
nections between new nodes and existing nodes in the HIN
plays a pivotal role in providing rapid numerical representation
and cost-effective malware detection. To do so, it is imperative
to calculate and accumulate the similarity between vout and
existing nodes. Following similar methodology presented in
[30], the node similarity between node vi and node vj under







where ΨMPij implies the number of meta structures between
two connected nodes and thus a higher similarity indicates a
tighter association between these two nodes. Accordingly, the
node similarity between node vi and node vj under a meta
graph MG is:
SimMG(vi, vj) = Sim
MP1(vi, vj)⊙ ...⊙ Sim
MPm(vi, vj).
(8)
Incremental aggregation for embedding learning. The ini-
tial task is to catch the incremental relationships and construct
the graph information. Within a given meta-structure, we
aim to only update an adjacency matrix that quantifies the
connectivity between the out-of-sample nodes and existing in-
sample App nodes. This should be done in an incremental
manner to reduce the training cost. In practice, we first repeat
the steps aforementioned in § III-B to calculate all relation
matrices in Table II merely for out-of-sample App nodes.
Secondly, we concatenate the relation matrices of new App
nodes and those of existing App nodes to form an incremental
segment of the node adjacency Ψ̂Mk – a pathway from an in-
sample App node to a new node. Take MP1 as an example;
we first obtain the relation matrix Aout for all new nodes
and then generate the matrix by Ψ̂M1 = Ain · A
T
out. This
design ensures the incremental adjacency matrix Ψ̂Mk can
function independently from the established adjacency matrix
ΨMk whilst they together serve as the holistic abstract of
connectivity among all nodes.
We propose MSGAT++ to entitle numerical embedding to
new nodes whilst calibrating existing node’s representation.
Similar to MSGAT, the model consists of two steps: intra-
ms and inter-ms aggregation. Given a semantic meta-structure
Mk, we substitute Ψ̂
Mk into Eq. 7 or Eq. 8 to calculate
SimMk(vj , vout), the similarity between a new node vout
and any in-sample App node vj . Repeating this for all out-of-
sampling nodes and all in-sample App nodes forms a similarity
matrix XMk where a larger value inherently indicates a
closer proximity between two nodes. Accordingly, we can
obtain a collection of similarity matrix for all meta-structures
{XM1 , . . . ,XMK}.
Arguably, to better represent the new node in a numerical
vector, we should fully aggregate existing embedding results
of existing nodes in closely proximity to the new node. To
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Algorithm 1 Incremental embedding algorithm in MSGAT++
Input: An out-of-sample App vout
Output: vout’s vector embedding Φ̂vout and the updated embedding
matrix Φ for existing in-sample App nodes
1: for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
2: // select σ in-sample App nodes with the highest similarity
3: {vn1, . . . , vnσ} ← DescendSort(X
Mk ).topK(σ)
4: // Calculate the weights
5: {α
Mk
v1 , . . . , α
Mk
vσ } ← Eq.10





9: // Embedding fusion from all meta structures
10: Φ̂vout ← Eq. 11
11: return Φ̂vout , Φ
this end, we select top-σ in-sample App nodes (vn1, . . . , vnσ),
based on the similarity matrix XMk , and aggregate their








where αMkvj denotes the weight of the node vj (vj ∈
(vn1, . . . , vnσ)) under Mk and Φ̂ implies the incremental
embedding information for the out-of-sample node exclusively.






Eventually, we re-calibrate the embedding by conducting inter-





βMk · Φ̂Mkvout , (11)
where βMk can be obtained from Eq. 5 (In fact, to improve the
performance of our model, we need to fine-tune these weights).
Alg. 1 outlines the whole procedure of our rapid incremental
embedding learning in the malware detection.
Time complexity. Alg. 1 demonstrates a simple but efficient
approach with an acceptable complexity. The overall complex-
ity is O(KLNlogN) where K and L are the number of meta-
structures and the number of out-of-sample Apps, respectively
while N represents the number of in-sample Apps.
V. EXPERIMENT SETUP
A. Methodology
Environment. HAWK is evaluated on a 16-node GPU cluster,
where each node has a 64-core Intel Xeon CPU E5-2680
v4@2.40GHz with 512GB RAM and 8 NVIDIA Tesla P100
GPUs, Ubuntu 20.04 LTS with Linux kernel v.5.4.0. HAWK
depends upon tensorflow-gpu v1.12.0 and scikit-learn v0.21.3.
ApkTool and aapt.exe are used for parsing Apps.
Datasets. According to the aforementioned discussion of
feature engineering in §III-A, we overall decompiled 181,235
APKs (i.e., 80,860 malicious Apps and 100,375 benign Apps)
Table IV
DESCRIPTIONS OF EVALUATION METRICS.
Metrics Description
TP The number of malicious Apps that are correctly identified
TN The number of benign Apps that are correctly identified
FP The number of benign Apps that are mistakenly identified
TN The number of malicious Apps that are mistakenly identified
Precision TP/(TP + FP )
Recall TP/(TP + FN)
FP -Rate FP/(FP + TN)
F1 2 ∗ Precision*Recall/(Precision+Recall)
Acc (TP + FN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN)
from 2013 to 2019. with the help of AndroZoo6, benign Apps
are primarily collected from GooglePlay store while malicious
Apps are obtained from VirusShare and CICAndMal. To
validate the compatibility, both forward and backward, of the
proposed model in HAWK, we train our model based on Apps
released in 2017 (amid the seven time span), and then utilize
it to detect Apps published from 2013 to 2019.
Specifically, we extracted 14,000 benign and 9,865 mali-
cious Apps released in 2017, as in-sample Apps, to construct
the HIN and train the detection model. For generating the
out-of-sample sample data, we collected 7 malware subsets
(v2013 to v2019), each of which contains roughly 10,000
samples, from VirusShare over consecutive seven years, to-
gether with another 2 subsets from CICAndMal, including 242
scarewares/adwares samples in 2017 (c2017) and 253 samples
in 2019 (c2019). Meanwhile, we extracted benign Apps to
match the same number of benign Apps in each subset above.
Methodology and Metrics. The experiments are three-fold:
we firstly evaluate the effectiveness of HAWK against tradi-
tional feature-based ML approaches and numerous baselines
in terms of in-sample and out-of-sample scenarios (§VI-A).
Afterwards, we demonstrate the efficiency of HAWK by com-
paring the training time consumption with other approaches
(§VI-B). We further conduct several micro-benchmarkings,
including an ablation analysis of performance gains, an eval-
uation of meta-structure’s importance and the impact of the
sampled neighbor number on detection precision (§VI-C).
We use metrics Precision, Recall, FP -Rate, F1 and
Accurate to measure the effectiveness (see Table IV), and
use time consumption to measure the efficiency. The execution
time includes the process of generating embedding vectors and
detecting Apps whilst excluding the process of extracting Apps
relation matrix. We use 5-fold cross validation and calculate
the average accuracy to provide an assurance of unbiased and
accurate evaluation.
B. Baselines
To evaluate the performance of MSGAT in HAWK, the
baselines encompasses generic models and specific models
used by some well-known malware detection systems.
Generic models. We firstly implement the following generic
models as comparative approaches:
6https://androzoo.uni.lu
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• Node2Vec [31] is a typical model generalized from Deep-
Walk [32] based on homogeneous graph network.
• GCN [9] is a semi-supervised homogeneous graph convo-
lutional network model that retains feature information and
structure information of the graph nodes.
• RS-GCN represents the approach to converting the HIN into
homogeneous graphs, applying native GCN to each graph and
reporting the best performance among different graphs.
• GAT [10] is a semi-supervised homogeneous graph model
that utilizes attention mechanism for aggregating neighbor-
hood information of graph nodes.
• RS-GAT denotes the approach to converting the HIN into
homogeneous graphs based on rich semantic meta-structures,
applying native GAT to each homogeneous graph and report-
ing the best performance among different graphs.
• Metapath2Vec [23] is a heterogeneous graph representation
learning model that leverages meta-path based random walk to
find neighborhood and uses skip-gram with negative sampling
to learn node vectors.
• Metagraph2Vec [24] is an alternative model to Metap-
ath2Vec; both meta paths and meta graphs are applied to the
random walk.
• HAN [26] is a heterogeneous graph representation learning
model that utilizes predefined meta paths and hierarchical
attentions for node vector embedding.
For Node2Vec, GCN and GAT, we treat all the nodes in
HIN as the same type to obtain the homogeneous graph.
Since all these models are towards static graphs, we compare
the capability of out-of-sample detection between MSGAT++
and three generic strategies that can be easily adopted in any
comparative models:
• Neighbor averaging (NA) directly averages the vector
embedding of the in-sample neighbors pertaining to a given
new App as the targeted embedding.
• Sampled neighbor averaging (SNA) further filters the
neighbor range by sampling a fixed number of in-sample
neighbors based on the sorted node similarity and simply
averaging their embedding as the targeted embedding.
• Re-running (RR) primarily merges the out-of-sample Apps
with in-sample Apps and rebuilds the entire HIN and the
malware detection model.
Specific models deriving from specialized systems. Sec-
ondly, we compare our models in HAWK against the following
models used by the existing malware detection systems:
• Drebin [33] is a framework that inspects a given App by
extracting a wide range of features sets from the manifest
and dex code and adopts the SVM model in the classifier.
• DroidEvolver [34] is a self-evolving detection system to
maintain and rely on a model pool of different detection
models that are initialized with a set of labeled Apps using
various online learning algorithms. It is worth noting that we
do not directly compare against MamaDroid [35], because it
has been demonstrated less effective than DroidEvolver.
• HinDroid [18] constructs a heterogeneous graph with enti-
ties such as App and API and and the rich in-between rela-
tionships. It aggregates information from different semantic
meta-paths and uses multi-kernel learning to calculate the
representations of Apps.
Table V
THE F1 VALUE AND ACCURACY OF IN-SAMPLE APPS DETECTION.
Metrics Approaches 20% 40% 60% 80%
F
1
Node2Vec 0.8355 0.8378 0.8542 0.8601
GCN 0.8653 0.8677 0.8721 0.8763
GAT 0.8435 0.8633 0.8752 0.8801
Metapath2Vec 0.9231 0.9321 0.9328 0.9395
RS-GCN 0.9212 0.9510 0.9515 0.9560
RS-GAT 0.9507 0.9631 0.9653 0.9664
HAN 0.9511 0.9617 0.9671 0.9705
Metagraph2Vec 0.9750 0.9766 0.9764 0.9771
SVM (Drebin) 0.9312 0.9387 0.9446 0.9477
DroidEvolver 0.9412 0.9517 0.9566 0.9605
HinDroid 0.9643 0.9669 0.9684 0.9746
MatchGNet 0.9395 0.9511 0.9604 0.9753
Aidroid 0.9321 0.9399 0.9414 0.9455
MSGAT (HAWK) 0.9857 0.9859 0.9871 0.9878
A
cc
Node2Vec 0.8254 0.8388 0.8405 0.8593
GCN 0.8558 0.8663 0.8630 0.8692
GAT 0.8461 0.8645 0.8758 0.8833
Metapath2Vec 0.9259 0.9321 0.9335 0.9388
RS-GCN 0.9199 0.9494 0.9527 0.9544
RS-GAT 0.9486 0.9620 0.9652 0.9664
HAN 0.9521 0.9657 0.9675 0.9699
Metagraph2Vec 0.9686 0.9698 0.9748 0.9762
SVM (Drebin) 0.9295 0.9356 0.9407 0.9455
DroidEvolver 0.9329 0.9506 0.9557 0.9623
HinDroid 0.9688 0.9698 0.9722 0.9764
MatchGNet 0.9302 0.9508 0.9536 0.9689
Aidroid 0.9227 0.9356 0.9367 0.9437
MSGAT (HAWK) 0.9843 0.9855 0.9867 0.9854
• MatchGNet [19] is a graph-based malware detection model
that regards each software as a heterogeneous graph and learns
its representation. It determines the threat of an unknown
software primarily through matching the graph representation
of the unknown software and that of benign software.
Aidroid [21] is among the first attempts to tackle out-of-
sample malware representations with heterogeneous graph
model and CNN network. Following the detailed description
in the paper, we utilize one-hop and two-hop neighbors to best
function its model performance.
Model parameters. For Node2Vec and Metapath2Vec, we set
the number of walks per node, the max walk length, and the
window size to be 10, 100, 8, respectively. For GCN, GAT and
HAN, we set up the parameters suggested by their original
papers. For the fairness of comparison, each model will be
trained 200 times. The length of embedding vectors delivered
by these models are set to be 128.
VI. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
A. Detection Effectiveness
In-sample malware detection against DL models. We
choose 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% of the in-sample Apps to train
the Logistic Regression model and the residual for testing.
Table V illustrates the F1 and Acc scores of each models.
In general, MSGAT can achieve competitive classification
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0.9284 0.9804 0.9736 0.9687 0.9695 0.9865 0.9858 0.9561 0.9493
0.8184 0.729 0.7861 0.8438 0.9599 0.7226 0.8807 0.6915 0.6499
0.8217 0.669 0.789 0.8467 0.9449 0.7249 0.8845 0.7495 0.6505
0.8186 0.629 0.7849 0.8435 0.9592 0.7248 0.8807 0.6885 0.6489
0.843 0.6756 0.7656 0.8048 0.923 0.7109 0.8906 0.6639 0.6185























0.9217 0.9783 0.9728 0.9682 0.9689 0.9865 0.9858 0.9554 0.9483
0.8254 0.7516 0.8001 0.8429 0.9599 0.7544 0.8771 0.7486 0.725
0.8285 0.6616 0.8028 0.846 0.9499 0.756 0.8814 0.6921 0.726
0.8283 0.6516 0.7988 0.8421 0.9592 0.7549 0.8771 0.7457 0.7231
0.8423 0.6701 0.7659 0.7764 0.9235 0.7157 0.8928 0.691 0.6623








Figure 5. Comparisons with Traditional Machine Learning Methods.
Table VI
THE F-P RATE OF IN-SAMPLE APPS DETECTION.







Node2Vec 0.0425 0.0393 0.0388 0.0342
GCN 0.0350 0.0323 0.0333 0.0318
GAT 0.0343 0.0334 0.0299 0.0268
Metapath2Vec 0.0177 0.0175 0.0169 0.0165
RS-GCN 0.0184 0.0118 0.0109 0.0107
RS-GAT 0.0115 0.0088 0.0079 0.0075
HAN 0.0108 0.0098 0.0085 0.0087
Metagraph2Vec 0.0071 0.0068 0.0059 0.0057
SVM (Drebin) 0.0163 0.0155 0.0135 0.0139
DroidEvolver 0.0154 0.0116 0.0101 0.0108
HinDroid 0.0075 0.0078 0.0071 0.0068
MatchGNet 0.0193 0.0129 0.0122 0.0081
Aidroid 0.0184 0.0171 0.0150 0.0139
MSGAT (HAWK) 0.0038 0.0034 0.0032 0.0035
accuracy when compared the popular malware detectors such
as Drebin, DroidEvolver, MatchGNet, HinDroid and AiDroid.
Compared with F1 and Acc scores, similar observations can
be found in Table VI when measuring False Positive rate. This
is because our graph-based representation learning models
can fully integrate the feature information of Apps and the
implied semantic information between Apps, which improves
the expression ability. In addition, the accuracy of RS-GCN
and RS-GAT can be improved by over 5% compared with
native GCN and GAT. Such approaches convert the original
HIN into homogeneous graph and the improvement derives
from preserving the semantic information in the heterogeneous
networks through our proposed semantic meta-structures.
It is worth noting that Metagraph2Vec and MSGAT achieve
the highest precision, particularly compared against Metap-
ath2Vec and HAN that only involve meta-paths. The accuracy
gain, obviously, stems from introducing meta-graphs that bring
rich semantics to mine more complex semantic associations.
In addition, MSGAT outperforms Metagraph2Vec as our
models adopt the aggregation mechanisms for both inter-
meta-structure and intra-meta-structure, thereby aggregating
semantic information from far more comprehensive views.
Out-of-sample malware detection against DL models. Ta-
ble VII and Table VIII show the F1 score and False Positive
rate, respectively, when we adopt different in-sample models
and out-of-sample policies. Overall, the NA and SNA policies
have the lowest detection accuracy under all cases due to
the substantial loss of semantic information. Obviously, direct
averaging operation ignores the discrepancies among neigh-
bors thereby reducing the precision of node embedding and
the resultant detection effectiveness. It is also observable that
NA and SNA have very similar precision in almost all cases.
This indicates sampling a certain number of neighbor nodes
is able to achieve approximate information in comparison to
averaging all neighbor nodes.
Intuitively, the re-running policy will deliver the best perfor-
mance of detection over all datasets since all data either new or
old will involve in the embedding retraining. Metagraph2Vec,
RS-GAT and RS-GCN outperforms Metapath2Vec, GAT and
GCN due to the benefit from abundant meta-structures. This
performance improvement again demonstrates applying abun-
dant semantic meta-structures into embedding models can
bring a stronger generalization capacity.
As shown in Table VII, MSGAT, together with the re-
running policy, achieves the best detection effectiveness on
2/3 datasets. This can be attributed to the highly rich meta-
structures used to include all possible contributions from
both intra- and inter- meta-structure aspects. Nevertheless,
rerunning has non-negligible overheads particularly in terms of
long training time (we will demonstrate the time consumption
later). By contrast, MSGAT++ is proved to be a compromising
but competitive solution; the precision of MSGAT++ is in
close proximity to the rerunning baselines over all datasets.
To demonstrate the generalization, we also implement our
MSGAT++ mechanism upon the HAN model. Similarly, the
incremental learning scheme makes far better improvements
when compared against native NA and SNA, only with ne-
glectable margin from the rerunning baseline.
Hindroid, MatchGNet, HG2Img and Drebin observably de-
liver unstable outcomes across different datasets, indicating
a limited generalization ability. This is probably because
Hin2Img and Hindroid are more dependent upon large train-
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NA 0.5888 0.6746 0.6965 0.6740 0.6811 0.6744 0.6680 0.6533 0.6995
SNA 0.6541 0.6732 0.6965 0.6935 0.6851 0.6665 0.6685 0.6638 0.6845
Rerunning 0.7564 0.8102 0.7956 0.8124 0.8236 0.7549 0.7968 0.7765 0.7945
GCN Rerunning 0.8637 0.8705 0.8459 0.8496 0.8697 0.8743 0.8637 0.8567 0.8537
GAT
NA 0.7364 0.7423 0.7153 0.7155 0.7545 0.6225 0.7203 0.6352 0.6442
SNA 0.7433 0.7521 0.7056 0.6962 0.6842 0.7121 0.6831 0.6720 0.6318
Rerunning 0.8242 0.8448 0.8531 0.8474 0.8731 0.8595 0.8457 0.8511 0.8476
NA 0.7414 0.8424 0.7835 0.7784 0.7537 0.8243 0.8473 0.8160 0.8183
Metapath2Vec SNA 0.7564 0.8531 0.7765 0.7496 0.7365 0.8359 0.8363 0.8242 0.8156
Rerunning 0.9240 0.9321 0.9195 0.9214 0.9342 0.9326 0.9285 0.9094 0.9052
HAN
NA 0.7455 0.7405 0.6361 0.7433 0.7292 0.7443 0.7245 0.7101 0.7253
SNA 0.7593 0.7635 0.7793 0.7723 0.8046 0.7803 0.7566 0.7543 0.7768
Rerunning 0.9155 0.9626 0.9678 0.9588 0.9758 0.9522 0.9677 0.9482 0.9574
MSGAT++ 0.8896 0.9611 0.9512 0.9462 0.9466 0.9655 0.9583 0.9358 0.9386
RS-GCN Rerunning 0.9532 0.9549 0.9487 0.9499 0.9656 0.9651 0.9745 0.9539 0.9471
RS-GAT
NA 0.7564 0.9400 0.8104 0.6755 0.7345 0.6423 0.7520 0.6152 0.5931
SNA 0.7564 0.9400 0.8601 0.6744 0.5290 0.7253 0.7323 0.5807 0.7707
Rerunning 0.9260 0.9321 0.9428 0.9582 0.9498 0.9392 0.9372 0.9485 0.9593
NA 0.7658 0.9763 0.8041 0.7955 0.7693 0.8665 0.7614 0.8267 0.8084
Metagraph2Vec SNA 0.7672 0.7769 0.8155 0.7996 0.7805 0.8665 0.7628 0.8239 0.8084
Rerunning 0.9533 0.9688 0.9255 0.9382 0.9201 0.9667 0.9718 0.9234 0.9040
Drebin 0.7442 0.7723 0.7856 0.8277 0.9432 0.7761 0.7891 0.7559 0.7413
DroidEvolver 0.7972 0.8469 0.8519 0.8996 0.9605 0.9265 0.9028 0.8539 0.8584
HinDroid 0.8946 0.9232 0.9298 0.9277 0.9712 0.9159 0.9466 0.9396 0.9245
MatchGNet 0.8981 0.8965 0.9323 0.8833 0.9675 0.9265 0.9053 0.9123 0.9137
HGiNE (AiDroid) HG2Img 0.8842 0.9723 0.9556 0.9272 0.9455 0.8761 0.8991 0.8959 0.9013
NA 0.7693 0.7601 0.6465 0.7725 0.7693 0.7741 0.7741 0.7401 0.7454
MSGAT SNA 0.7795 0.7845 0.7996 0.8058 0.8241 0.7955 0.7832 0.7791 0.8071
Rerunning 0.9569 0.9824 0.9876 0.9720 0.9769 0.9808 0.9805 0.9621 0.9693
MSGAT++ 0.9007 0.9804 0.9736 0.9687 0.9695 0.9665 0.9658 0.9461 0.9393
ing samples and thus has lower precision on some specific
datasets. MatchGNet may have limited its performance by
neglecting the correlation information between Apps during
the construction of the graph. In Drebin, SVM is leveraged
as the feature-based machine learning technique, making it
difficult to deal with malware with rapidly changing features.
DroidEvolver is also based on feature engineering and updates
its model in an online manner according to out-of-sample
Apps, leading to a competitive classification accuracy. Nev-
ertheless, purely relying on explicit features is intrinsically
deficient compared with semantic-rich approaches.
Comparison against traditional feature-based ML models.
We mainly use Random Forest (RF), Logistic Regression (LR),
Decision Tree (DT), Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (GBDT)
and AdaBoost as comparative baselines. In this experiment, we
particularly use v2017 as the train set to build the HIN, whilst
leveraging the out-of-sample Apps with various released time
or various source as the test set. Following the method in
[3], we extract information from permission, API, class name,
interface name and .so file to construct the feature vector with
63,902 dimensions, which are reduced to 128 dimensions via
principal component analysis (PCA).
Fig. 5 illustrates the F1 score and accuracy score pro-
duced by different models over different test sets. Observably,
HAWK stably outperforms all traditional baselines in all cases
when carrying out the App classification. Traditional ML
approaches are competitive (with Acc or F1 score around
0.95) only when the testing set is aligned with the training set
(v2017) while HAWK can constantly deliver precise results.
Interestingly, the performance of traditional approaches is
constantly poor over the dataset of some specific years, e.g.,
v2014 and c2019. After examining the features involved in
the PCA, we infer the root cause for this phenomenon is
because some features are preferably used by malicious Apps
in those years but have yet been captured in the training
set. For example, ’Ljava/lang/Cloneable’ and the .so
file ’libshunpayarmeabi’ manifests in v2014 as the
dominating features in the PCA but they are less important in
the principle components in v2017. Similar observations can
also be found for the c2019. This is an interesting research
finding while the further in-depth study is currently beyond
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NA 0.1052 0.0846 0.0819 0.0782 0.0776 0.0846 0.0763 0.0971 0.0819
SNA 0.0968 0.0831 0.0758 0.0811 0.0862 0.0883 0.0852 0.0806 0.0789
Rerunning 0.0682 0.0531 0.0576 0.0534 0.0508 0.0698 0.0579 0.0643 0.0569
GCN Rerunning 0.0377 0.0359 0.0428 0.0412 0.0366 0.0356 0.0374 0.0394 0.0406
GAT
NA 0.0711 0.0708 0.0754 0.0736 0.0648 0.0981 0.0727 0.0963 0.0911
SNA 0.0675 0.0655 0.0779 0.0804 0.0836 0.0754 0.0830 0.0859 0.0966
Rerunning 0.0461 0.0408 0.0387 0.0403 0.0334 0.0370 0.0406 0.0394 0.0403
NA 0.0690 0.0419 0.0575 0.0593 0.0655 0.0460 0.0398 0.0474 0.0459
Metapath2Vec SNA 0.0616 0.0371 0.0565 0.0634 0.0667 0.0416 0.0415 0.0455 0.0467
Rerunning 0.0192 0.0173 0.0205 0.0201 0.0167 0.0171 0.0182 0.0230 0.0241
HAN
NA 0.0644 0.0657 0.0921 0.0650 0.0686 0.0647 0.0701 0.0737 0.0701
SNA 0.0614 0.0603 0.0563 0.0581 0.0496 0.0559 0.7566 0.0625 0.0568
Rerunning 0.0215 0.0094 0.0091 0.0104 0.0061 0.0121 0.0081 0.0131 0.0108
MSGAT++ 0.0279 0.0098 0.0123 0.0136 0.0135 0.0087 0.0105 0.0162 0.0165
RS-GCN Rerunning 0.0119 0.0115 0.0131 0.0127 0.0087 0.0088 0.0065 0.0117 0.0134
RS-GAT
NA 0.0619 0.0153 0.0484 0.0822 0.0672 0.0906 0.0628 0.0975 0.1039
SNA 0.0622 0.0153 0.0358 0.0835 0.1203 0.0702 0.0683 0.1071 0.0585
Rerunning 0.0189 0.0172 0.0145 0.0106 0.0127 0.0154 0.1586 0.0130 0.0106
NA 0.0591 0.0059 0.0494 0.0521 0.0586 0.0339 0.0607 0.0441 0.0485
Metagraph2Vec SNA 0.0591 0.0565 0.0467 0.0507 0.0556 0.0338 0.0599 0.0444 0.0483
Rerunning 0.0117 0.0079 0.0188 0.0156 0.0202 0.0084 0.0071 0.0196 0.0242
Drebin 0.0653 0.0583 0.0547 0.0440 0.0145 0.0572 0.0538 0.0623 0.0653
DroidEvolver 0.0517 0.0391 0.0376 0.0255 0.0101 0.0187 0.0248 0.0372 0.0365
HinDroid 0.0241 0.0177 0.0253 0.0157 0.0061 0.0201 0.0149 0.0153 0.0162
MatchGNet 0.0257 0.0218 0.0137 0.0236 0.0065 0.0156 0.0201 0.0185 0.0173
HGiNE (AiDroid) HG2Img 0.0295 0.0071 0.0113 0.0185 0.0139 0.0316 0.0257 0.0265 0.0252
NA 0.0589 0.0608 0.0895 0.0576 0.0584 0.0572 0.0577 0.0659 0.0648
MSGAT SNA 0.0561 0.0549 0.0510 0.0494 0.0448 0.0521 0.0552 0.0563 0.0491
Rerunning 0.0109 0.0044 0.0032 0.0071 0.0058 0.0049 0.0049 0.0097 0.0078
MSGAT++ 0.0232 0.0049 0.0067 0.0079 0.0077 0.0085 0.0086 0.0136 0.0154
the scope of this paper and will be left for future work.
To sum up, the disparity of precision implies the difficulty
in applying traditional ML models – merely relying on explicit
feature extraction – into reliable malware detection considering
the explosively growing types and numbers of Apps in the
market. In comparison, HAWK is able to mine the high-order
relations between Apps, with the help of HIN, and thus has
strong generalization, i.e., high effectiveness regardless the
type and size of datasets.
B. Detection Efficiency
Time consumption. In this experiment, we compare the time
efficiency of our incremental detection design MSGAT++
against those comparative approaches with an acceptable
detection accuracy (demonstrated in §VI-A), i.e., rerunning
HAN, rerunning Metagraph2Vec, Drebin, DroidEvolve and
HG2Img. It is worth mentioning that we exclude the extraction
time from calculating the overall execution time for the sake of
simplicity because all approaches in our experiment share the
same procedure of feature extraction. In fact, it approximately
takes 6.9 seconds per App to extract the feature information
from its original APK file.
As observed in Fig. 6, the execution time of MSGAT++
is much shorter than other approaches. MSGAT++ takes only
3.5 milliseconds on average to detect a single out-of-sample
App. This millisecond level detection by HAWK illustrates its
suitability in the real-time malware detection scenario at scale.
In particular, MSGAT++ can accelerate the training time by
50× against the native approach that rebuilds the HIN and
reruns the MSGAT. The acceleration primarily derives from
our incremental learning design that can make full use of
previously learned information without the need of rerunning
the entire model. In addition, MSGAT++ merely selects a
fixed number of neighbor nodes to re-calibrate the embedding
so that the time consumption only increases linearly with the
increment of out-of-sample number.
By contrast, other rerunning HIN-based baselines is pre-
dominantly dependent upon updating embedding for all nodes
based on the starting relation matrix. This leads to discrepan-
cies between MSGAT++ and others with the rerunning policy
when tackling out-of-sample Apps. HG2Img relies on a certain
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Figure 6. Efficiency comparison of detecting out-of-sample Apps.
Table IX
ABLATION ANALYSIS
Model Acc F1 AvgDetectionTime
HAWK 0.9695 0.9689 3.5ms
HAWK-I (w/o MSGAT) 0.8731 0.8725 1.8ms
HAWK-R (w/o MSGAT++) 0.9769 0.9769 205ms
amount of update operations to learn new features, resulting
in a non-negligible time consumption.
System overhead. Overall, the overheads are generally low,
mainly generated from loading model data and carrying out
the multi-tiered aggregation operations. Runtime memory con-
sumption is typically determined by the number of nodes and
features involved in the model training. The total memory
consumption of HAWK is roughly 330MB on average, far
lower than the consumption of re-running based baselines
(20.88GB on average). This is because all in-sample and out-
of-samples have to fully loaded into memory and involved in
the embedding calculation while our incremental design sig-
nificantly reduce such costs. Correspondingly, HAWK merely
uses 3.1% additional CPU utilization on average, mainly for
sorting out top-σ samples. By contrast, the CPU utilization
is up to 76% in rerunning baselines wherein CPU-intensive
matrix operations have to be performed. The low system cost
also indicates the suitability of applying HAWK into massive-
scale malware detection.
C. Microbenchmarking
Ablation analysis. To investigate the impact of each compo-
nent, we remove one component at a time from our model and
study the individual impact on the effectiveness of detecting
the out-of-sample Apps. We identify two tailored subsystems:
i) HAWK-I by only retaining native GAT model and removing
the hierarchical GAT structure from HAWK and ii) HAWK-R
by excluding the incremental design. Table IX reports their
accuracy and average time to detect a single App on v2017.
Without multi-step and hierarchical aggregation within a
meta-structure and across meta-structures, HAWK-I can reduce
the average detection time to 1.8ms. However, both accuracy
and F1 score are reduced by 9.9% compared with HAWK.
This phenomenon demonstrates the accuracy gain stemming
from fusing embedding results under different meta-structures.
HAWK-R takes far longer time to detect a malware App,
simply because no incremental model is loaded and everything














Figure 7. Model performance under different path combinations.
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Figure 8. Impact of sampling neighbor number.
needs to be re-trained from scratch. Inherently, although the
accuracy experiences a negligible increase due to the full data
involved in the model training, the detection efficiency of
HAWK-R is still unacceptable taking into account the long
execution time. Hence, it is necessary to adopt the incremental
MSGAT++ to ensure a reliable and rapid malware detection.
Importance of meta-structures. In our model design, a
group of meta-paths and meta-graphs are adopted to represent
different semantic information. To ascertain the individual
contribution to the detection effectiveness, we select a single
meta structure at a time in this experiment. Fig. 7 depicts
the metric disparities among different meta structures. More
specifically, among all meta-paths, MP1 and MP4 have the
highest and lowest contribution to the detection precision. In
fact, when analyzing the decompiled codes, we are able to
extract far more API information than .so files so that the
relation matrix A is denser than S, and thus contains more
connection information for node embedding.
Observably, using meta-graphs can achieve higher detection
precision when compared to purely using meta-paths, for a
combination of meta-paths can find neighbors with closer
affinity. Likewise, if comparing with the results in Table V,
MSGAT that involves the full set of semantic meta-structures
unsurprisingly outperforms any situation where only a single
semantic meta-structure is adopted. This implicates that in-
troducing sophisticated semantics is significantly meaningful
to precisely uncover hidden association between entities for
better classification.
Impact of the sampling neighbor number. As shown in
Fig. 8, the precision will first pick up within a certain range
but descend once the number of sampling neighbors becomes
larger (surpassing four in our experiment setting). In effect,
increasing neighbors can provide more relevant and informa-
tive embedding for the reference of the new nodes. However,
as the neighbors begin to accumulate, noises generated by
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more irrelevant neighbors will, in turn, negatively impact the
embedding aggregation, i.e., diminishing the representation
learning effectiveness. This implication reveals that gauging an
appropriate number of neighbors is very critical to the holistic
performance of embedding incoming Apps and identifying
their types. We choose 3 to 4 neighbors to generate a good
enough effectiveness, but one can tune the number either
manually according to specific datasets or automatically em-
powered by reinforcement learning. This is currently beyond
the scope of this paper and will be left for future work.
A case study of True Negative detection. The experiments
also reveal that the true negative result manifests occasion-
ally. In other words, a small minority of malicious Apps
may not be correctly identified by our model. For example,
VirusShare_ecc4c2e7, VirusShare_f21ff00cf in
v2013 bypass our detection. An in-depth investigation ascer-
tains that the embedding of such malicious apps will be assim-
ilated by its benign neighbor nodes which are overwhelming
in the process of MSGAT++. In fact, since these malicious
Apps have far fewer entities (no more than 30 entities) than
others (normally with more than 200 entities) used in the
training, the neighbors of these malicious apps obtained by
HAWK are sparser and tend to be benign Apps, resulting in
the inaccurate classification. To address this problem, we plan
to employ a label-aware neighbor similarity measure based on
node attribute to better navigate the neighbor selection and
distinguish the malware more efficiently in the future. Never-
theless, HAWK can achieve better detection accuracy against
the up-to-date baselines, with far lower time consumption,
particularly when detecting the out-of-sample Apps.
VII. DISCUSSION
Interpretablity. HAWK is a data-driven modeling and detect-
ing mechanism based on Heterogeneous Information Network
and network representation model empowered by Graph At-
tention Networks (GATs). The model’s interpretability can
be significantly enhanced due to the inherent nature of rich
semantics, stemming from the combinations of meta-paths
and meta-graphs, in the HIN and the multi-tiered aggrega-
tion of attention from different semantics. Such an approach
intrinsically outperforms the SVM based approaches such as
Drebin [33] and Random Forest based approaches such as
MaMaDroid [35] which has inadequate interpretability.
Scalability. The current HIN-based data modeling is scalable
and can be easily extended, to any arbitrary entities and
relationships, as long as the semantics can be demonstrated
beneficial to the process of detection, either by domain knowl-
edge or experimental assessment. In addition, since our design
does not require any model rerun, the scalability can be
inherently guaranteed when coping with sizable samples.
Robustness to obfuscation. The semantic meta-structures
based on multiple entities - including permission, permission
types, classes, interfaces, etc. - can overcome the inefficiency
of API-alone detection approaches and provide a robust and
accurate mechanism for detecting potential malware, in the
face of API obfuscation, packing, or dataset skew (e.g.,
samples with less visible features such as .so files in the dataset
v2013). Particularly, the multi-tiered attention aggregation can
automatically set the weight of different meta-paths or meta-
graphs, thereby substantially reducing the impact of a single
factor, e.g., the API obfuscation, on the numerical embedding
and increasing the capability of generalization over different
datasets and scenarios.
Model aging and decays. Concept drift (aka. model aging,
model decays) usually makes trained models fail to function
on new testing samples, primarily due to the changed statistical
properties of samples over time. The existing work [36]–
[38] measured how a model performs over time facing the
concept drift, underpinned the root causes for such drift and
proposed enhanced approaches to improve the model sustain-
ability. However, active learning typically involves massive
labeling for tens of thousands of malware samples, usually
at a significant cost of human efforts. By far, this issue is not
the focus and objective of HAWK; In contrast, MSGAT++ in
HAWK aims to rapidly embed and detect the out-of-sample
Apps, based upon the existing embedding results, assuming
a relatively stable statistical characteristics of the existing
Apps. At present, model evolving will be carried out through
rerunning of MSGAT, which is demonstrated acceptable in
terms of accuracy and time consumption (detailed in §VI-B).
More advanced mechanism for improving the model evolution
will be left for the future work.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Malware detection based on traditional feature engineer-
ing. Feature engineering and machine learning based malware
detection methods are two-fold: static/dynamic feature anal-
ysis. Static features analysis approaches [2]–[4], [33]–[35]
typically include features including permissions, signatures,
API sequences, etc. and directly employ such machine learning
models as Random Forest, SVM or CNN for malware detec-
tion. However, they inevitably over-assume that all behaviors
reflected by features should be involved within the model train-
ing, thereby having inadequate capability of tackling unknown
out-of-sample cases and causing much higher false positive
[3]. Meanwhile, cunning developers can also use obfuscation
techniques to hide the malicious codes [7] or perform repack-
aging attacks [39] to bypass detection. [34] can automatically
and continually update itself when detecting malware without
any human involvement. Nevertheless, this scheme only proves
that it has ability to adapt to updates, but does not show its
compatibility with previous data sets. In comparison, dynamic
feature analysis rely on behavior detection at runtime. Specif-
ically, [5], [6] extract Linux kernel system calls from Apps
executed in Genymotion (Android Virtual Machine) while log
analysis [7], [40] and traffic analysis [8], [41] facilitate
to capture Apps’ real-world behavior. However, it is time-
consuming and unrealistic to be applied in malware detection
at scale. Other models from natural language processing and
image recognition can be customized and re-used in malware
detection. [2] uses a deep convolutional neural network (CNN)
to analyze raw opcode sequence. [42] transforms sequences
of Android permissions into features by using LSTM layer
and uses non-linear activation function for classification. [43]
exploits LSTM to investigate potential relationships from
system call sequences before classification. However, since
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Apps are constantly updated, explicit features extraction from
limited Apps is ineffective in detecting unseen Apps.
Malware detection based on graph networks. Gotcha [17]
builds up a HIN and utilizes meta-graph based approach
to depict the relevance over PE files, which captures both
content- and relation-based features of windows malware.
HinDroid [18] is primarily on the basis of a HIN built upon re-
lationships between APIs and Apps, and employs multi-kernel
SVM for software classification. MatchGNet [19] combines
HIN model with GCN [9] to learn graph representation and
node similarity based on the invariant graph modeling of the
program’s execution behaviors. [20] constructs heterogeneous
program behavior graph, particularly for IT/OT systems, and
then introduces graph attention mechanism [25] to aggregate
information learned through GCN on different semantic paths
with weights. However, all these methods are impeded by the
static nature of the heterogeneous information network, i.e.,
they have limited capability of tackling emerging Apps outside
the constructed graph. AiDroid [21] represents each out-of-
sample App with CNN [22]. However, the non-negligible time
inefficiency stemming from multiple convolution operations
becomes a potential bottleneck. HAWK presents the first at-
tempt to bridge the HIN-based embedding model and graph
attention network to underpin incremental and rapid malware
detection particularly for out-of-sample Apps.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Malware detection is a critical but non-trivial task par-
ticularly in the face of ubiquitous Android applications and
the increasingly intricate malware. In this paper, we propose
HAWK, an Android malware detection framework to rapidly
and incrementally learn and identify new Android Apps.
HAWK presents the first attempt to marry the HIN-based
embedding model with graph attention network (GAT) to
obtain the numerical representation of Android Apps so that
any classifier can easily catch the malicious ones. Particularly,
we exploit both meta-path and meta-graph to best capture
the implicit higher-order relationships among entities in the
HIN. Two learning models, MSGAT and incremental MS-
GAT++, are devised to fuse neighbors’ embedding within
any meta-structure and across different meta-structures and
pinpoint the proximity between a new App and existing in-
sample Apps. Through the incremental representation learning
model, HAWK can carry out malware detection dynamically
for emerging Android Apps. Experiments show HAWK outper-
forms all baselines in terms of accuracy and time efficiency.
In the future, we plan to integrate HAWK to smart mobile
devices by devising lightweight and efficient graph convolution
models, such as [44], [45] to replace the existing modules.
We also plan to investigate more advanced mechanism for
underpinning the model evolving in the face of model decays
particularly in federated learning environments.
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